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Akers and his sales personnel sold a total of seven-
teen vehicles, identified as "factory cars," to the
plaintiffs in this consolidated action. In each case, the
prospective buyer had been informed by Akers or his
staff that the car to be sold was a "demo" or a "factory
demo." Additionally, all of the plaintiffs obtained their
financing through the dealership. Many of these retail
installment sales contracts either falsely identified the
vehicles in question as new or "demos," or falsely listed
the seller as Chrysler Corporation rather than the car
rental agency that actually had owned the vehicle. In
addition, the sales contracts often stated either an
inflated value for the car purchased or a decreased value
for the car traded in to reduce the amount of tax the
dealership owed to the state.
Only the dealership liable
Eddie and Mary Bowling filed the initial suit against
Akers. Subsequently, some of the Bowlings' allegations
were published in the local newspaper. Ultimately,
sixteen additional lawsuits against the dealership were
filed. In total, the plaintiffs alleged twenty-one com-
plaints involving common law fraud and violations of
both the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act.
The cases were consolidated for trial and proceeded
only on the common law fraud allegations. After all the
evidence was presented, the trial court directed a
verdict for Akers, the president. Although the jury
returned a compensatory damage verdict against the
corporation, it denied an award of punitive damages.
The trial court also refused to award attorney fees and
denied the dealership's motion for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, or in the alternative, for a
remittitur based on the depreciation of the vehicles from
the time of purchase to the time of trial.
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decision. On
appeal, they contended that the court erred both in
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Renter protected only at time of leasing agreement
By Sandra Berzups
In Richwind Joint Venture 4 v.
Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147 (Md.
1994), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a landlord who
knows or has reason to know of a
threat from lead-based paint on the
rental premises may be liable for
negligence arising from either
conmon law or statutory duty when
she failed to correct the situation in a
timely manner. However, the court
also held that under the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), a
landlord could be held liable neither
for renting a unit with intact lead-
based paint nor for failing to
respond to the hazardous conditions
resulting from lead-based paint in
the absence of notice. To find
otherwise would subject the landlord
to a strict liability standard for
defects occurring on the premises.
Furthermore, the court declared that
the CPA is limited to material
misstatements and omissions
occurring solely at the inception of
the lease and does not apply to those
that may occur during the term of
the lease. Such grievances may be
best addressed by the state's
comprehensive landlord and tenant
statutes and common law remedies.
Lead paint violations cited
In December 1983, Barbara
Richardson took possession of a
residential rental property in
Baltimore owned by Harry and Rita
Baitch. While residing there, she
gave birth to two children, Jamika
and Jamall. Subsequently, in
December 1985, the Baitches sold
the rental property to Richwind Joint
Venture ("Richwind"), a general
partnership. Richwind then hired
Scoken Management Corporation
("Scoken") to manage the property.
In part, Richwind had selected
Scoken because its president, Mark
Chodak, had extensive experience in
rental property management and had
once worked as a housing inspector
in Baltimore. At the time of pur-
chase, there were no outstanding
building violation notices against the
property. However, neither
Richwind nor Scoken personally
inspected the premises.
Upon assuming ownership of the
property, Richwind notified
Richardson of the management
change. Beginning January 15,
1986, Richardson sent Scoken a
series of complaint letters describing
the poor conditions of the premises.
In one letter, she specifically
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informed Scoken that the paint and
plaster were peeling from the walls
of the rental property. In response,
Chodak dispatched a Scoken
employee to correct the problem.
However, Chodak did not personally
inspect the premises, nor did anyone
follow up to determine whether the
problem had been corrected.
On September 3, 1986, the
Kennedy Institute Lead Poisoning
Prevention Program diagnosed both
of Richardson's children as having
elevated blood-lead levels. In
addition, the younger of the two,
Jamall, was hospitalized and
underwent chelation therapy, a drug
treatment that assists the body in
removing lead from the blood.
Following this hospitalization,
the Baltimore City Health Depart-
ment inspected the rental property.
Upon completing its inspection, it
issued an "Emergency Violation
Notice and Order to Remove Lead
Nuisance" to Richwind and Chodak,
citing forty-two specific lead paint
violations of the Baltimore City
Code ("Code").
Tenant alleges negligence
Richardson filed a complaint in
the Baltimore Circuit Court on
behalf of her two children for
injuries sustained as a result of
exposure to lead-based paint.
Ernestine Brunson, the children's
grandmother, substituted as plaintiff
upon Richardson's death.
In her complaint, Brunson
alleged that the defendants-
Richwind, Scoken, and the Baitches
(hereafter collectively referred to as
Richwind)-were negligent, created
a nuisance, and violated the cpA.
Specifically, Brunson alleged that
Richwind breached its duty to
protect its tenants from injury
caused by the lead-based paint on
the leased premises. She also
contended that Richwind violated
the CPA by failing to disclose the
unsafe conditions of lead-based
paint at the inception of the lease.
Rita Baitch settled before the
trial. In addition, the trial court
dismissed the nuisance claim against
the remaining defendants. At trial,
the court granted the defendants'
motion for judgment on the CPA
counts. However, the jury subse-
quently returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs on the negligence
claim, awarding over $500,000 in
compensatory damages to the
children and damages to
Richardson's estate.
The defendants then appealed the
jury's verdict and Brunson cross-
appealed. The Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the jury's finding
of negligence but reversed the lower
court's judgment on the CPA claim.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to address two
issues: (1) whether a landlord's
liability based on statutory and
common law requires notice and
reasonable time to correct a defect;
and (2) whether the CPA imposes
strict liability for personal injury
upon a landlord without proof of
knowledge, deception, reliance, or
causation.
Notice required
On appeal, Richwind first argued
that liability for negligence can only
be imposed when the landlord has
actual knowledge of the defective
condition on the premises, a
contractual duty to repair such
conditions, and a reasonable
opportunity to correct the situation.
Furthermore, Richwind contended
that statutory provisions, which it
conceded may affect the common
law requisites for liability, cannot
supersede the common law require-
ment of notice and opportunity to
correct.
The court accepted Richwind's
concession that statutory enactments
may affect the fundamental nature of
the landlord-tenant relationship,
imposing duties on the landlord
beyond those required by common
law. For example, in the case at bar,
the court noted that the Code's
implied warranty of habitability
provided that dwellings be "kept in
good repair, in safe condition, and fit
for human habitation." Moreover,
the Code also provided that such
hazardous conditions as flaking,
loose, or peeling lead-based paint
render a premise unfit for human
habitation. From its reading of the
Code, the court concluded that a
landlord was under a statutory
obligation to correct a hazardous
condition, such as peeling or flaking
lead-based paint. Furthermore, it
declared that evidence of the
municipal violation provided notice
of the defective condition. In such
cases, the tenant herself was not
required to provide additional notice
to the landlord.
Continuing its analysis, the court
then examined whether the Code's
provisions expanded common law
liability. It observed that the
statutory provisions in question
provided for both notice to the
landlord and opportunity to correct
the defective condition in a manner
analogous to common law. The court
of appeals thus concluded that the
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Code reinforced rather than super-
seded the common law prerequisites
for a claim of negligence.
Landlord knew of defect
The court next addressed the
issue of whether Richwind or its
agent had adequate knowledge of
the hazardous condition resulting
from the lead-based paint on the
rental premises. To make its
determination, the court reviewed
the trial record. It concluded that
Chodak's testimony at trial indicated
that he possessed adequate general
knowledge from his years of
experience in the Baltimore City
housing market that older homes,
such as the rental property in
question, often contained lead-based
paint that could be dangerous to
children if peeling or flaking.
Furthermore, the court declared that
the jury could reasonably find that
Chodak possessed specific knowl-
edge regarding the peeling lead-
based paint from Richardson's
complaint letters. From these
sources, the court concluded that
Richwind had adequate notice of the
hazardous condition on the property.
Having found that Richwind
possessed adequate notice, the court
concluded that the landlord had
negligently failed to remove the
hazard properly even though there
had been opportunity to do so.
Therefore, it held there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the jury's
verdict of negligence on the part of
the landlord.
Law's application limited
Resolving the negligence claim
in favor of the plaintiffs, the court of
appeals then addressed the issue of
the alleged cPA violations. In its
analysis, the court first examined the
legislative history of the CPA. It
noted that the CPA, passed in 1975
and amended in 1976, set certain
minimum statewide standards to
protect consumers from unfair and
deceptive trade practices, including
those involving rental consumer
realty. Turning specifically to the
issue of deceptive practices between
landlords and tenants, the court
stated its belief that the legislature
had intended the CPA to apply to
deceptive statements and omissions
concerning rental property only at
the inception of the lease, and not
those that may occur during the
course of the agreement. In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that
the General Assembly had created a
comprehensive system of landlord/
tenant laws, in addition to existing
common law, to regulate landlord
behavior during the course of the
lease. Additional protections would
be unnecessary. Furthermore, the
court suggested that expanding the
cPA to cover deceptive practices
beyond the inception of the lease
would impose a standard equivalent
to strict liability on the landlord for
any defect arising on the premises.
The court stated that this exceeded
the scope of the cPA as envisioned by
its creators. Consistent with this
interpretation, the court similarly
reasoned that a landlord's silence
about a condition arising during the
term of the lease, rather than prior to
or at the time the lease was entered
into, was not a violation of the CPA.
It noted that at such times, the
tenant, who had acquired control
over the property, possessed greater
knowledge about its condition than
the landlord, who had relinquished
her exclusive control.
In the present case, the court
noted that when Richardson signed
the lease, there was no evidence of
peeling or chipping paint on the
rental property. If there had been, a
CPA claim could have been brought
against the Baitches, the owners of
the premises at that time. However,
when Richwind took title,
Richardson had been in exclusive
possession and control for two
years. Because superior knowledge
of the premises had shifted to the
tenant, no CPA cause of action could
be brought against Richwind for
deceptive practices at the inception
of the lease, or its subsequent silence
about the conditions. Accordingly,
the court held that Richwind had not
violated the CPA.
In summary, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland found Richwind
negligent for its failure to respond to
notice of the hazards created by the
peeling lead-based paint on its
rental property. However, it was not
liable for violations under the CPA.
Hospital liable
Continued from page 77
to create an exception where the
legislature did not intend one.
No time limit on claim
The defendant then contended
that both of Bell's claims had been
properly dismissed as they were
barred by the state's medical
malpractice statute of limitations.
This statute requires plaintiffs to file
claims against a health care provider
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no more than two years from the
occurrence of the health care
provider's malpractice, negligence,
error, or mistake. In response, Bell
argued that the statute did not limit
her strict products liability claim
because it applied only to claims of
malpractice or negligence.
The appellate court agreed that
the Missouri statute in question
applied only to malpractice, negli-
gence, error, or mistake claims
related to health care. It observed
that each of these classifications
connoted an element of fault on the
defendant's part. On the other hand,
strict products liability required no
showing of fault. As such, the court
found that Bell's strict products
liability claim could not be properly
characterized as a claim that would
be barred by the statute. Conse-
quently, the court held that the
medical malpractice statute of
limitations applied only to Bell's
negligence claim and not to her
strict products liability claim. The
Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment
as to Bell's claim of negligence.
However, it reversed the summary
judgment as to the strict products
liability claim and remanded it for
further proceedings.
Fraudulent scheme
Continued from page 78
directing a verdict for Akers and in
denying an award of reasonable
attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia first turned
to the issue of whether the lower
court had erred in directing a verdict
for Akers. The appellate court, after
looking at the laws of other states,
concluded that if an officer or
director of a corporation "directed,
sanctioned, or participated in the
wrongful acts, including fraud," then
the officer may be personally liable
for the tortious acts of the corpora-
tion. Furthermore, it held that the
officer need not have actual knowl-
edge of the fraudulent acts. Instead,
constructive knowledge was
sufficient. Additionally, evidence of
this constructive knowledge can be
proven by circumstantial evidence,
including "evidence of similar
transactions in the course of a
systematic way of doing business."
Applying these standards to
Akers, the appellate court focused
on the direct and circumstantial
evidence available and found that a
jury could reasonably find that
Akers sanctioned the fraudulent
activities. It pointed specifically to
the fact that Akers: (1) purchased the
vehicles with full knowledge that
they were used rental cars; (2)
directed his lot employees to remove
any evidence from the vehicles that
they had been rental cars; (3)
advertised the cars as "factory cars"
with full knowledge that they were
not; (4) conceded at trial that the
terms of the advertisements were
likely to mislead consumers; (5)
testified that he was fully aware of
everything that occurred with
respect to his business; (6) wrote a
letter to the editor of the local
newspaper claiming full responsibil-
ity for the sales and service provided
at the dealership; and (7) signed
sixteen of the sales installment
contracts which contained false and
misleading information. In light of
these circumstances, the court found
that there was ample evidence from
which a jury could conclude that
Akers knew, approved of, and
sanctioned the fraudulent plan. The
court therefore held that the trial
court erred in directing a verdict for
Akers and remanded the case for a
new trial.
Attorney's fees available
The trial court refused to grant
the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's
fees because punitive damages, a
prerequisite to attorney's fees in a
fraud action, had not been awarded.
The appellate court, however, found
that denial of punitive damages did
not preclude an award of reasonable
attorneys' fees. Rather, it concluded
that a finding of fraud is an action in
bad faith, and thus, is exempted
from the general rule that precludes
an award of attorney's fees.
In making this determination, the
appellate court focused on the
popular understanding of the term
"fraud," which contains an element
of "moral turpitude or bad faith." It
reasoned that the plaintiffs had made
a sufficient showing that the
dealership acted in bad faith and that
these actions resulted in injury to the
plaintiffs. Consistent with this
analysis, the court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees, in addition to
compensatory damages.
Recent laws
Continued from page 76
The Illinois General Assembly,
seeking to improve the relationship
between home buyers and both real
estate brokers and salespeople,
recently passed the Brokerage
Robson Special Issue, 1995 Recent Cases * 81
Relationships in Real Estate
Transactions Act. Taking effect
September 1, 1994, this law
amended the state's 1983 Real
Estate Licensing Act by creating
Article IV.
Article IV defines the roles and
duties of all parties in a real estate
transaction and specifies the
accountability of each party to the
others. Through the definition of
roles and duties, Article IV elimi-
nates a common-law agency
relationship between consumers and
real-estate brokers and salespeople.
By eliminating the common law
concepts of principal, agent, and
fiduciary duty, Article IV creates
private rights of action and defense
under the Act. For example, the law
requires that brokers and salespeople
treat all customers honestly and that
they should not negligently or
knowingly give consumers false
information. Additionally, brokers
and salespeople must disclose all
material facts pertaining to the
physical condition of the property
that are actually known to them or
that could reasonably be discovered
by a reasonable and diligent
inspection. However, brokers or
agents are not responsible when
false information is provided by the
client or when they did not have
actual knowledge that the informa-
tion was false.
Information regarding the
physical condition of houses to be
sold will likely be provided from
sellers to brokers or salespeople in
the form of a questionnaire. The
provided information will include
knowledge of any problems or
defects with the property's founda-
tion, plumbing, roof, furnace or
other physical features. 225 ILCS
455/38 (1994).
Wholesale defined
Springfield, Ill.-"Wholesale"
means "wholesale."
Illinois Governor Jim Edgar
recently signed legislation amending
the state's Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Practices Act. The recent
addition of Section 2CC to the Act
provides that a person, firm, or
corporation offering merchandise for
retail sale by advertising that the
merchandise is for sale at "whole-
sale" or "wholesale price" is guilty
of an unlawful practice and subject
to penalties as prescribed in the Act.
The amendment makes it an
unlawful practice to advertise
directly or by implication that an
individual or a company is a
wholesaler or sells merchandise at
wholesale to the public. In order to
sell merchandise at wholesale, a
person or company must make a
substantial and significant number of
sales for resale in the ordinary
course of business and substantiate
savings on the prices offered as
compared to merchandise offered
for sale by retailers in the trade area.
Furthermore, this law now
governs the sale of individual items
sold by a person or company in a
retail setting. Accordingly, a seller
may only advertise or sell merchan-
dise as "wholesale" if she can
substantiate significant savings as
compared to retail prices. 815 ILCS
505/2CC (1995).
Pricing practice
Continued from page 74
Arkansas Supreme Court, however,
concluded that Wal-Mart's practice
of selling selected items below cost
was an attempt to attract customers
and is "markedly different from a
sustained effort to destroy competi-
tion. Furthermore, the court held that
this practice was not illegal under
state law and was justified as a way
to "foster competition and to gain a
competitive edge as opposed to a
stratagem to eliminate rivals
altogether."
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